Background Paper

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PEACEKEEPING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

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Turmoil, conflict and war, whatever their local causes and consequences, affect most other regions of the world. Quite naturally "the world" seeks the means to avoid these conflicts, to stop them when they do occur; or at least limit or confine the violence and hostilities pending efforts by diplomatic means to peacefully resolve the disputes in question. The people in Central America, Sri Lanka, Southern Africa and the Middle East who are caught up in this turbulence seek external assistance to end hostilities. And the rest of the world fears that any of these or other conflicts could escalate into an international nuclear holocaust.

Such appeals to "the world" become appeals to the United Nations, which is directly charged and empowered, according to the Charter, to "maintain international peace and security." The record of the United Nations has been mixed. Much less has been accomplished than was expected from the organization when it was established in 1945. It has, nonetheless, given rise to the practice of peacekeeping which has demonstrated both achievement and promise.

Canadians have a longstanding history of moral and practical support for the United Nations. Approximately 77,000 Canadian servicemen and servicewomen have participated in UN peacekeeping and observer missions. It is therefore understandable that Canadians should now endeavour to continue along that road and also to try and improve the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Every year, at the United Nations, diplomats exclaim the virtues of peacekeeping. They implore all Member States to make better and more frequent use of this international mechanism in the management of conflict and the maintenance of international peace and security.

WHAT IS PEACEKEEPING?

Simply stated, **peacekeeping is the use of military personnel to monitor and supervise a cease-fire between belligerents.** The expectation is that once a cease-fire has been assured, the political climate will become more conducive to diplomatic negotiation and possible settlement through direct diplomacy by the Secretary-General or some other third party.

Peacekeeping was first introduced by the United Nations in the 1948 war between the newly-created state of Israel and the Arab world, although this was an observer mission only. United Nations Peacekeeping operations involving supervision of a ceasefire among belligerents did not take place until the Suez crisis of 1956. The United Kingdom, France and Israel had launched a combined attack on Egypt to prevent the nationalization of the Suez Canal (a vital oil lifeline to the West before the days of super tankers) and to stop Palestinian raids into Israeli territory. Occurring in the same weeks as the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the situation threatened to engulf other nations in the conflict.

At the Security Council, heated discussion and accusation characterized the search for a formula to solve the immediate crisis. Innovative Canadian diplomacy under the guidance of Lester Pearson resulted in the adoption of a General Assembly resolution to establish "an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities." Thus peacekeeping evolved as an important phenomenon in the international system. Six thousand men from ten countries were sent to "secure and supervise" the cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Peace reigned on the Sinai for ten years. Then in 1967, contrary to the intent of arrangements reached in 1956, Egypt advanced its military forces into the Sinai toward Israel and demanded that the United Nations withdraw the Emergency Force. The Secretary-General agreed, and in the face of the rising crisis, war ensued.

Yet this creative, innovative mechanism of 1956 set the pattern for the introduction of ten similar operations over the next twenty-two years. Peacekeeping evolved into two basic types. Though they

both are called peacekeeping, the term is generally applied to large-scale operations like that of 1956, in the Congo (now Zaire) in 1960, Cyprus in 1964 and again in the Middle East in 1973 and 1978. The second type comes under the category of observation, such as the deployment of small numbers of troops to a maximum of 600 designed only to observe and report any violations to a cessation of hostilities. Examples are the introduction of United Nations observers between India and Pakistan after the war of 1948 and again in the Middle East after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES

The total experience now ranges over forty years. As a result, basic principles and practices have evolved which are to the greater extent based on United Nations experience. They are critical to an understanding of the very nature of peacekeeping; namely what, how, and in what circumstances it can be applied, what it is able to accomplish and what are its limitations.

Firstly, a peacekeeping force is introduced by an international organization or similar auspices as an impartial third party to stand between and to assist in keeping belligerents at bay. Peacekeepers must be neutral. They should not take sides in a dispute. Otherwise the operation would be partisan and unacceptable to one or another of the belligerents.

Secondly, peacekeeping is a non-enforceable measure. This is critically important. It is not intended or designed as a fighting force to impose its will on the parties in conflict. Peacekeepers are authorized to use force only in self-defence. The reasons for this derive from the very nature of the legal structure and political evolution of the United Nations. These are not at all likely to be altered in the foreseeable future.

The fundamental purpose of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security. This specific responsibility was given to the Security Council which is empowered to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces" as may be necessary. Because, however, the Cold War antagonisms and hostility between East and West penetrated the politics of the United Nations from its very inception, the Security Council has been unable to use these powers to fulfill this essential obligation. Any such action requires the concurrence of the five permanent Members: Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the United States, which each have a veto in the Council. They have, quite simply, never agreed on the necessity and the utilization of enforcement measures in any crisis situation. The only proximate case was the decision in 1950 to use force to repel North Korean aggression on South Korea. That was possible only because the Soviet Union was at the time absent from the Council and hence unable to veto the resolution.

Peacekeeping has therefore evolved as a low-level substitute for enforcement action. The Charter makes no reference whatsoever to peacekeeping. Hence peacekeeping operations are not authorized to use force except in self-defence under direct attack. This principle is rigorously adhered to and means that peacekeeping forces are always few in number relative to the military capability of the parties whose cease-fire is being observed, monitored, supervised or secured.

This leads to the fourth principle, namely that of consent. In all cases the parties in a dispute have agreed to the interpositioning of UN forces in specified areas within their own territory. The 'host' countries and the UN in fact sign agreements detailing the conditions under which UN forces operate on their sovereign territory. Not only do these agreements define where the UN personnel can operate, but also what they are permitted or not permitted to do outside the specified zones. Within specified zones the types of peacekeeping are governed by UN resolutions.

The matter of consent raises the basic question as to whether a host country has the right to insist on withdrawal for national reasons before the expiry of the mandate. That is what Egypt did in 1967 when its troops moved into the Sinai desert and advanced toward Israel in contravention of the peacekeeping mandate of 1956. The UN did withdraw, but under much controversy. War ensued.

Then, after the war between Egypt and Israel in 1973, a second contingent, United Nations Emergency Forces II (UNEF II), was introduced. The mandate says that UNEF II shall continue in operation, if required, provided the Security Council so decides. But the matter has never been tested. UNEF II was withdrawn in 1981 when it became evident that the Soviet Union would veto any resolution renewing the mandate. UNEF II was therefore replaced by a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), a new hybrid outside the auspices of the UN, and created under the leadership and direction of the United States with the agreement of Egypt and Israel.

The fifth principle relates to the matter of composition. Which states are willing and able to contribute contingents to a UN force? What are the political and possible financial advantages or disadvantages? Then there is the principle of consent which suggests that the host country should have the right to accept or reject a potential contributor. Generally this principle is adhered to, although Israel objected to Polish troops in UNEF II in the Sinai and in UNIFIL on the Golan Heights. Although the UN insisted on their participation, Israel has not permitted Polish personnel to enter Israeli-held territory, complicating UN operations. For similar reasons there are no communist states which contribute troops to UNFICYP in Cyprus.

The overriding factor, however, is the general principle that peacekeeping forces should be composed

of units from the middle and small powers to the exclusion of the permanent Members because the latter may have a direct interest in the conflict and might attempt to exert undue influence. This principle has been circumvented due to extenuating circumstances in the cases of British troops in Cyprus, French troops in Lebanon and a very small number of Soviet and American personnel in UNTSO in the Middle East.

These matters of composition, may, however, clash with the sixth principle, namely that there be adequate geographic representation on peacekeeping operations from East, West and the Third World. This has not always been possible because communist states have either not offered to participate, or have been judged unacceptable by one or more parties. The matters of equitable geographical composition and of consent must be resolved in each case.

The remarkable fact, however, is that some fifty-four countries have contributed to UN peacekeeping forces. Closer scrutiny shows that the actual numbers are in decline. The reasons are varied. Many states do not have sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel, especially for dangerous service in the Middle East. There is also the matter of finances. Will the contributor countries be adequately reimbursed? Unfortunately many Member States have not paid their peacekeeping assessments, placing the UN in a difficult financial position. While some small countries which contribute troops are motivated by payment, others, like Canada, are seldom fully paid. One can argue that the cost of peacekeeping is a pittance in comparison to national defence budgets. Nonetheless, this is a decision that each government must make for itself.

The seventh principle relates to the issue of command and control, historically a very contentious issue. Who runs the operation? This is not a simple question. There are fifteen states on the Security Council, five of which are the permanent Members. These five all have representatives on the Military Staff Committee, which, under the Charter, is supposed to manage military affairs. In practice, this has been found to be impracticable. What has evolved over time is that the Secretary-General appoints the Commander, who is approved by the permanent Members. The Secretary-General directs overall policy from his office in New York through his Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. Both are always sensitive to and consult with the members of the Security Council in initial situations.

There have been many disputes over command and control. In the Congo in 1960, the USSR accused the Secretary-General of partisanship when he refused to allow Soviet aircraft, carrying military supplies to one of the political factions, to land. The question of impartiality will always be present where, as is almost invariably the case, East and West may be supporting opposite sides in the conflict being supervised by UN forces. In the Congo case, the USSR refused to pay its assessment for the operation, as it also refused to pay for UNEF I. As a consequence, in 1964 the UN was pushed close to a state of paralysis over this issue.

The matter of financing, the seventh principle, took many years to resolve. It was not until 1973 that a formula of scaled assessments was adopted for UNEF II; the wealthier states paying more, the poorer states less. The same arrangement was later adopted for UNDOF on the Golan Heights and for UNIFIL in Lebanon. Even so, the actual resolution of 1973 declares that an arrangement be adopted "without prejudice to the positions of principle that may be taken by Member States"; meaning that they could later change their policies. Finance is a continuing problem. One could foresee instances, however, in which the major powers, particularly the superpowers were jointly so strongly committed that they would ensure that an operation be properly financed.

The total cost of UN peacekeeping from 1948 to 1985 was $3 billion. The accumulated deficits amount to over two hundred million dollars. But many states are in arrears and others simply refuse to pay for specific operations. There is no means to force states to pay. The frequent argument is that the aggressor should pay the costs. In no case, apart from the unique case of Korea, has a resolution named any party in a conflict as an aggressor. On the one hand it is difficult, if not impossible, to know how and when an act of aggression actually begins. The criteria which define an aggressive act include, among several items, the types of provocation and the issue of naming the initiator of the attack. On the other hand, it would be politically counter-productive to label a country an aggressor. That country would then be very likely to withhold its consent for the operation and refuse to co-operate.

MANDATES AND FUNCTIONS

The most important and dramatic function of UN peacekeeping is the interposition of neutral force to supervise a cease-fire. This was the case on four occasions in the Middle East, each following the outbreak of war, and in Cyprus because of civil violence between two antagonistic communities. The language of the mandates authorizing these operations is, as in all other cases, very sparse. In the heat of a crisis the fifteen members on the Security Council are unlikely to agree on anything more than the minimum objectives. Any attempt to go beyond them, and define details would generate disagreement and possibly ruin the whole process. Sample mandates read: for UNEF II, "Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed . . . [and] Decides to set up immediately . . . a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from state members of the United Nations except the permanent members of

the Security Council;" for UNFICYP, "with the consent of the government of Cyprus . . . to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." It is up to the Secretary-General to interpret the mandates and put them into actual practice.

The largest, most difficult and complex operation took place in the Congo from 1960-64. A force of twenty thousand men was initially deployed to "provide the government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until . . . the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the government to meet fully their tasks." The newly independent government was untrained, weak and ineffective at a time when Belgium, the former colonial power, sent troops back into the country, ostensibly to protect its nationals from the outbreak of violence. The crisis in the Congo resulted from the combination of ineffective government; rival claims to power, with the USSR and the US backing opposing sides; and the attempt, with the support of Belgium, of the mineral-rich province of Katanga to secede — in all, a prescription for chaos. The UN, itself embroiled in all of these issues, barely managed to contain the situation. UNIFIL, in Lebanon since 1978, has experienced somewhat similar difficulties.

Other mandates have been more limited, requiring fewer personnel to monitor and report on cease-fires or alleged cross border infiltrations. A particularly unique operation took place in West Irian in 1962, where a UN force actually "managed" the territory during the transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule. The most recent operation in Lebanon calls for an interim force "for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces . . . restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area."

Just a brief look at the thirteen UN operations shows how peacekeeping has evolved from the limited function of observing and reporting on a cease-fire to the more complex and difficult tasks of supervising the withdrawal of troops, preventing a renewal of hostilities, maintaining law and order, preventing infiltration, restoring normal conditions and also, in some cases, assisting local populations in economic activities and the provision of humanitarian services.

There is a wide range of responsibilities, which vary from case to case. Monitoring a negotiated cease-fire between state belligerents is one thing. Attempting to do the same in a civil war or guerrilla type situation where there are no clear battle lines and where independent non-government parties are entirely self-directed and unresponsive to the UN or the norms of international law is quite another matter. Daily reports from Lebanon are adequate testimony of how difficult it is to manage that kind of situation and attempt to restore peace.

After all, restoring and/or establishing peace is the ultimate purpose of peacekeeping. But a distinction has to be made between actual **peacekeeping,** the containment of conflict, and **peacemaking,** the pacific settlement of conflict. Too often the failure of peacemaking is wrongfully attributed to peacekeeping. The confusion is, however, understandable. For example, a UN peacekeeping force has been in Cyprus since 1964. Despite many efforts, the Greek and Turkish communities are still at loggerheads. No peaceful solution is in sight. Yet the peacekeeping operation continues and actually contributes to the maintenance of the status quo. If it didn't, violence might escalate and war occur, with possibly devastating consequences for the region and beyond. After a time the parties see the advantage of keeping UN troops in place. A delicate peace is maintained, and the parties, by avoiding a final settlement, don't have to give anything away.

This of course raises the problem of duration. UNFICYP has been in Cyprus for 23 years, and UNEF I existed for ten years before being thrown out. UNTSO has been in the Middle East since 1948. These and the other peacekeeping operations have been crucial in containing crises of such great magnitude that they threatened to involve the superpowers in direct hostilities. But that avoided, peacekeeping goes on with no resolution of the conflicts in sight. There are exceptions: UNEF II was absolutely critical in helping to establish conditions which in turn led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Still, the problem of duration has to be confronted. No matter how difficult, it is much easier to start a peacekeeping operation than to end one. The potential dangers of renewed or escalating hostilities are too great a risk.

THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

It is therefore a very important matter to examine the nature of a conflict in order to assess whether peacekeeping could contain the situation and lead to a settlement. Who are the parties in conflict? What are the issues? Are they of recent or longstanding origin? Is there room for manoeuvre and compromise, or is it, in the eyes of one or another of the parties, an all-or-nothing situation?

Over the years peacekeeping has been introduced in a variety of crises and situations which seem to defy solution. Some examples would be the Congo, Cyprus, Lebanon. In many cases, non-governmental parties with foreign governmental assistance in civil war situations are not responsive to international pressure. The politics of the situation may well go beyond the actual area of hostilities. And, as is so often the case, the superpowers back opposing sides. It is difficult to get

the superpowers to withdraw their support. There have been occasions, though, when both have simultaneously recognized that the risks of intensifying and spreading the conflict are far greater than any immediate advantage gained by supporting one side or the other. The Middle East war in 1973 is a prime example. Both the US and USSR were on military alert, both fearing and threatening direct intervention. Both sides withdrew.

Above all it is important to note that UN peacekeeping forces have never been introduced in a conflict where one of the superpowers is directly involved or anywhere which is within one of their extended orbits of strategic influence. Soviet military interventions in Eastern Europe or that of the United States in Vietnam were not conflicts amenable to UN peacekeeping. The same is presently true for the situations in Afghanistan and Central America. Historically, most peacekeeping has occurred in the Third World outside the areas of direct superpower dominance.

PEACEKEEPING BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Though peacekeeping is characteristically a UN phenomenon, it has also been used by regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAS is designed to guarantee peace and security in the American hemisphere by committing its members to collective security and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The OAS makes use primarily of diplomatic means to arbitrate or otherwise negotiate settlements of conflict. Nevertheless it has employed low level peace observation "peacekeeping" methods in seven interstate border disputes, and on two occasions in situations of domestic origin, all in Central America or in the Caribbean Basin.

Two other occasions appear similar to large-scale UN peacekeeping operations. In 1965-66 the dictator of the Dominican Republic, General Rafael Trujillo, was assassinated. The political situation threatened to drift to the left. To prevent that possibility the United States sent in 1,500 marines. This was later increased to 21,500 personnel, ostensibly to prevent deterioration of the situation into civil war, and to protect American citizens there. After the fact the OAS was asked to pass a resolution to sanction the operation by calling for an Inter-American Peace Force to monitor the situation. Five countries then sent an additional combined force of 2,000. Though classified as a "peacekeeping" operation, there is serious doubt about its purpose and impartiality.

In recent years, however, the OAS has suffered considerably from overzealous domination by the United States and a loss of internal cohesion. It was unable to take action in the Falklands/Malvinas crisis in 1982 or in Grenada in 1983. Nor has it attempted to seek a resolution of the current crisis in Central America, leaving that to the efforts of specific nations in the region, the so-called Contadora group and to other initiatives.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) came into being in the 1960's when the process of decolonization was far from complete. The central objectives of the organization were to pursue that goal and develop means for co-operation and unity among the newly independent African states. Emphasis was placed on "the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration". No thought or provision whatsoever was made for the use of military forces or peacekeeping. In fact, at the time, because many in Africa believed that the UN operation in the Congo was a neo-colonialist operation, peacekeeping was highly suspect.

As a consequence, the OAU was unprepared to manage serious conflicts when they did occur. In its first years, there were a number of attempts by the Organization at peacekeeping which failed to get off the ground. In the 1980's the civil war in the land-locked former French colony of Chad disintegrated into chaos. Libyan intervention further complicated the situation. The OAU became determined to try again. Before the OAU itself could take action there was an invitation to Nigeria by neighbouring states and Chad to police a demilitarized zone around the capital, N'Djamena, and to enforce a cease-fire. In March of 1979, Nigeria sent 800 men. The fighting continued and Nigerian troops were accused of partisanship. The concept of neutrality was not at all understood or appreciated. Each faction fighting for power believed that the Nigerians should be on their side.

Despite the Nigerian failure, the OAU made two attempts at peacekeeping in Chad in 1980 and again in 1981. The mandates called for approximately 5,000 independent military observers to supervise cease-fires, ensure freedom of movement throughout Chad, disarm the population, restore law and order and assist in the reorganization and integration of the warring factions. It was to be such a large-scale operation that the OAU asked the UN for financial and logistic support. The UN could not, however, accede to these open-ended requests in a situation where it would have no control. The efforts of the OAU were unrealistic and resulted in total failure. As before, each fighting faction saw the OAU force as its own saviour, and condemned it when it behaved as it was supposed to do, namely, as a neutral force to create and maintain peaceful conditions as a basis for a negotiated settlement.

The lessons of the African experience are very clear. The OAU does not have the infrastructure or the military, logistic and financial resources to mount a major peacekeeping operation. The parties in conflict are seemingly unprepared for a neutral non-enforce-

ment military interposition. Unless the details are clearly worked out in advance and fully understood by all concerned, and there is an evident reservoir of power and credibility behind the peacekeeping force, none is likely to be mounted in the future by the OAU.

INDEPENDENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Regional organizations do not currently display either the intent or capability to become involved in peacekeeping operations. Outside of the continuously dangerous Middle East, the UN has not mounted a peacekeeping operation since 1965. The trend, if we can call it that, is toward the use of independent arrangements.

Two early and by now almost forgotten peace observer missions were conducted in Vietnam. One began in 1954 and the other in 1973 when cease-fires were agreed and procedures for political settlements were established. In the first case the sponsoring "agency" consisted of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, in the second, the four belligerents. In each case there were thousands of violations. The composition of the observer commissions included a western state (in each case Canada), a communist state and a neutral state, which made it difficult to agree on anything of substance. Such reports as were filed, were ignored. The Vietnam experience is not likely to be repeated.

In the Middle East there were three independently sponsored peacekeeping operations: the Sinai in 1975, again in 1979, and in Beirut in 1982. In October of 1975 Israel agreed to a staged withdrawal from the Sinai and its return to Egyptian control. The UN was on the spot with UNEF II. But a specially designed technological early warning field station was required to monitor any possible infiltration by Egyptian forces through two key mountain passes after the Israelis withdrew. The parties agreed to a US civilian technical operation, the Sinai Field Mission, which worked very successfully and co-operated with the UN forces. When it was no longer required, the Field Mission was withdrawn.

When Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sinai in 1979 a peacekeeping force was still required to monitor the border. The USSR, however, threatened to veto the adaptation of UNEF II to these new circumstances because it opposed the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. The parties therefore agreed to an independent arrangement headed by the United States. Ten other countries participated, for a total force of about 2,500, known as Multinational Force and Observers, with Canada a recent contributor. Because the former belligerents fully support the arrangements, the functions of border observation are very precise. And because the US is trusted by both parties, the system has worked well. It is likely to be in place for many years to come.

The next case occurred in Beirut in 1982. The United States, at the behest of Israel, would not permit the redeployment of the UN forces from Southern Lebanon to supervise the withdrawal of Palestinian forces from Beirut and to "facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty and authority in Beirut." Therefore a substitute agreement provided for the return of the Multinational Force (MNF) consisting of 800 US marines, 800 French Legionnaires and 400 Italian troops. After the task was accomplished without serious incident within three weeks under the eyes of the world's press, the MNF was withdrawn.

Almost immediately, however, factional fighting broke out again, when Israeli forces re-entered Beirut and the Palestinian refugees in the Shatila and Sabra camps were massacred at the hands of Lebanese Phalangists. The Multinational Force (MNF) was called back to stop all fighting and establish order in the area. This time the British also participated.

The task was beyond them. They saw themselves as an interpository peacekeeping mission. But Syria, which had thirty thousand of its own so-called peacekeeping troops in Lebanon, and several of the Lebanese factions viewed the MNF, especially the Americans, as a military buttress to the Gemayel Christian Government which they opposed, and as an ally of Israel. Neutrality, the fundamental principle of peacekeeping was, in this chaotic 'war-torn' situation, meaningless. The same became true for the principle of the non-use of force. The MNF very quickly came under heavy artillery fire and terrorist attacks, and became engaged in hostilities. In the end the US contingent was bombed and 237 soldiers were killed.

The MNF had been heralded as a peacekeeping operation. But was it? Perhaps it was more like a partisan attempt to keep the peace under very unstable conditions. Whatever history will say, the MNF certainly defied all the norms and practices of what is generally known as peacekeeping. This effort is discussed here to point out that when peacekeeping is so badly misinterpreted or misapplied, the consequences can be disastrous.

Yet there is one very successful story to tell about independent peacekeeping — the transitional process from white minority to black majority rule in 1980 in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Guerrilla war had been going on for more than ten years. And though a victory for the blacks was a certain eventuality, incessant warfare and the devastation of the countryside exhausted all the parties. Consistent pressure from African states and the Commonwealth convinced Britain, the former colonial power, to take the lead in pressing for a negotiated settlement. They succeeded. The parties agreed to a cease-fire, the confinement of opposing forces to their bases and to a "Common-

wealth" peacekeeping force of 1,500 to monitor the process. Though the force was almost entirely British, it adopted and largely maintained a neutral stand, and it stringently avoided any use of force — classic peacekeeping. Best of all, an election was planned and held during the cease-fire under British supervision and several hundred international professional observers. There were many lessons and features in this operation that could well be applied to similar situations. One of the most important factors to note, however, was that the parties agreed in advance to the arrangements. And though they pushed at the edges to gain electoral advantage, none went so far as to destabilize the process or renew hostilities.

CONCLUSIONS

Fifty-six states in all have contributed military personnel to all peacekeeping, including observer operations. Of these, fifty-four have actually contributed to UN operations. That is a very substantial and laudable record.

Among them Canada is a prominent and consistent contributor, having participated in all UN and several of the operations of independent origin, all at considerable financial cost. Most Canadian land-based military personnel will, over time, serve on one or another peacekeeping operation. Peacekeeping will continue to be a prominent feature of Canadian foreign and defence policies.

A careful look, however, at the total record of participation shows that Western-oriented states have been and continue to be the most consistent contributors. By contrast, there has been a decrease in participation from Africa and Asia, and little participation from Communist States. Without a doubt this gives the appearance of Western dominance of peacekeeping operations.

Serious conflicts continue to disrupt the global system, some with disastrous consequences. Yet, the UN itself has not managed to use peacekeeping anywhere in the world except the Middle East since 1965. The trend, where it has occurred, has been to non-UN auspices. The basic reason is that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is able to exert its will over the one hundred and sixty members of the UN. They therefore choose to follow unilateral policies and initiatives rather than resort to multinational means for the management of crisis. Perhaps they believe that they can independently contain and influence events more in keeping with their own national interests.

Nonetheless the history of peacekeeping demonstrates a very effective multinational approach to the management of conflict. The difficulties in maintaining a neutral force are considerable and the costs may be high, especially in cases where the conflicts are fundamentally of domestic origin with the involvement of non-state actors, a most common characteristic of so-called international conflict since World War II. And there are occasions where peacekeeping itself is successful, but weakened in effect because the next phase of peacekeeping is not equally successful. Still, peacekeeping has achieved a prominent place on the international agenda. It is likely to be used again in the future. It is also reasonable to hope that the international political climate may be more conducive to more effective and frequent use of peacekeeping together with vigorous means of peacemaking.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER OPERATIONS

Acronym	Name	Date	Location
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization	1948-Continuing	Israel/ Middle East
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	1949-Continuing	Israel/ Middle East
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon	1958-1959	Lebanon
UNTEA	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority	1962-1963	West Irian
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	1963-1964	Yemen
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic	1965	Dominican Republic

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

UNEF I	United Nations Emergency Force	1956-1967	Israel/Egypt (Sinai Peninsula)
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo	1960-1964	Congo (now Zaire)
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus	1964 Continuing	Cyprus
UNEF II	United Nations Second Emergency Force	1973-1981	Egypt/Israel (Sinai Peninsula)
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	1974-Continuing	Israel/Syria (Golan Heights)
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	1978-Continuing	Lebanon

NON-UN INDEPENDENT PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE OBSERVING OPERATIONS

ICSC	International Commission for Supervision and Control	1954-1973	Vietnam
ICCS	International Commission for Control and Supervision	1973	Vietnam
USSM	United States Sinai Support Million	1976-1980	Sinai/Egypt
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers	1979-Continuing	Sinai/Egypt

	* Nigerian Peacekeeping	1979	Chad
CMF	Commonwealth Monitoring	1980	Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)
MNF I	Multinational Force	1982	Beirut
MNF II	Multinational Force	1982-1983	Beirut

*This operation is generally considered as an African regional operation but not sponsored by the OAU.

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE OBSERVATION OPERATIONS

	Date	Location
Investigating Committee Military Experts	1955	Costa Rica/ Nicaragua
Observation Team of Military Attachées	1955	Ecuador/ Peru
Investigating Committee of Military Advisors	1957	Honduras/ Nicaragua
Investigating Committee with Military Advisors	1959	Panama/Cuba
Investigating Committee with Military Advisors	1963-64	Cuba/ Venezuela
Inter-American Peace Force	1965-66	Dominican Republic
Supervision of Cease Fire Militarized Zone	1969-71	Honduras/ El Salvador
Verification of British Troop Strength	1972	Great Britain/ Guatemala
Military Observation	1976	Honduras/ El Salvador

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE OBSERVATION OPERATIONS

	Date	Location
Supervision of Cease-Fire & Restoration of Law & Order	1980	Chad

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CANADIAN PEACEKEEPING COMMITMENTS IN 1986*

Canada is presently committed to five UN-sponsored activities:

Korea: The Canadian Forces Attaché in Seoul represents Canada on the Participating Nations Advisory Group as part of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNMAC).

India-Pakistan: Canadian Participation in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India/Pakistan (UNMOGIP) involves the provision of a Hercules aircraft to assist in the twice yearly moves of UNMOGIP Headquarters between Sringar, India and Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

Cyprus: Canada has contributed peacekeeping troops to the United Nations Forces in Cyprus since 1964. During 1985, Cyprus continued to be the Canadian Forces' largest peacekeeping task, with 515 Canadian soldiers serving as peacekeepers on the island.

The Canadian contingent (CCUNFICYP) is responsible for a sector which includes the city of Nicosia where opposing factions are often only metres apart. Contingent operations involve manning observation posts along the ceasefire lines, conducting mobile patrols within the sector, investigating ceasefire violations, mediating disputes between the opposing forces and conducting humanitarian relief tasks.

Middle East: Canadian Forces continue to participate in two UN operations in the Middle East: the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

In addition in 1985, responding to a specific request by the governments of Egypt and Israel, Canada agreed to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers based in the Sinai Peninsula. In order to meet this request, the Canadian government has sent 140 service personnel and nine Twin-Huey helicopters modified for desert operations to the area. The Canadians deployed in March 1986 to replace an Australian helicopter unit.

*Excerpted from: *Facts About Peacekeeping. A Canadian Contribution to the World,* Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 1986.

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